One is often said to be reasoning well when they are reasoning logically. Many attempts to say what logical reasoning is have been proposed, but one commonly proposed system is first-order classical logic. This Element will examine the basics of first-order classical logic and discuss some surrounding philosophical issues. The first half of the Element develops a language for the system, as well as a proof theory and model theory. The authors provide theorems about the system they developed, such as unique readability and the Lindenbaum lemma. They also discuss the meta-theory for the system, and provide several results there, including proving soundness and completeness theorems. The second half of the Element compares first-order classical logic to other systems: classical higher order logic, intuitionistic logic, and several paraconsistent logics which reject the law of ex falso quodlibet.

The International research Library of Philosophy collects in book form a wide range of important and influential essays in philosophy, drawn predominantly from English-language journals. Each volume in the library deals with a field of enquiry which has received significant attention in philosophy in the last 25 years and is edited by a philosopher noted in that field.

The present work is a systematic study of five frameworks or perspectives articulating mathematical structuralism, whose core idea is that mathematics is concerned primarily with interrelations in abstraction from the nature of objects. The first two, set-theoretic and category-theoretic, arose within mathematics itself. After exposing a number of problems, the Element considers three further perspectives formulated by logicians and philosophers of mathematics: sui generis, treating structures as abstract universals, modal, eliminating structures as objects in favor of freely entertained logical possibilities, and finally, modal-set-theoretic, a sort of synthesis of the set-theoretic and modal perspectives.

This edited collection covers Friedrich Waismann's most influential contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of language: his concepts of open texture and language strata, his early criticism of verificationism and the analytic-synthetic distinction, as well as their significance for experimental and legal philosophy. In addition, Waismann's original papers in ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of mathematics are here evaluated. They introduce Waismann's theory of action along with his groundbreaking work on fiction, proper names and Kafka's Trial. Waismann is known as the voice of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Vienna Circle. At the same time we find in his works a determined critic of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy, who anticipated much later developments in the analytic tradition and devised his very own vision for its future.

This edited collection covers Friedrich Waismann's most influential contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of language: his concepts of open texture and language strata, his early criticism of verificationism and the analytic-synthetic distinction, as well as their significance for experimental and legal philosophy. In addition, Waismann's original papers in ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of mathematics are here evaluated. They introduce Waismann's theory of action along with his groundbreaking work on fiction, proper names and Kafka's Trial. Waismann is known as the voice of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Vienna Circle. At the same time we find in his works a determined critic of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy, who anticipated much later developments in the analytic tradition and devised his very own vision for its future.

Thinking about Mathematics covers the range of philosophical issues and positions concerning mathematics. The text describes the questions about mathematics that motivated philosophers throughout its history and covers historical figures, such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Mill. It presents the major positions and arguments concerning mathematics throughout the twentieth century, bringing the reader up to the present positions and battle lines.

Mathematics and logic have been central topics of concern since the dawn of philosophy. Since logic is the study of correct reasoning, it is a fundamental branch of epistemology and a priority in any philosophical system. Philosophers have focused on mathematics as a case study for general philosophical issues and for its role in overall knowledge- gathering. Today, philosophy of mathematics and logic remain central disciplines in contemporary philosophy, as evidenced by the regular appearance of articles on these topics in the best mainstream philosophical journals; in fact, the last decade has seen an explosion of scholarly work in these areas.
This volume covers these disciplines in a comprehensive and accessible manner, giving the reader an overview of the major problems, positions, and battle lines. The 26 contributed chapters are by established experts in the field, and their articles contain both exposition and criticism as well as substantial development of their own positions. The essays, which are substantially self-contained, serve both to introduce the reader to the subject and to engage in it at its frontiers. Certain major positions are represented by two chapters--one supportive and one critical.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Math and Logic is a ground-breaking reference like no other in its field. It is a central resource to those wishing to learn about the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of logic, or some aspect thereof, and to those who actively engage in the discipline, from advanced undergraduates to professional philosophers, mathematicians, and historians.

Mathematical and philosophical thought about continuity has changed considerably over the ages. Aristotle insisted that continuous substances are not composed of points, and that they can only be divided into parts potentially. There is something viscous about the continuous. It is a unified whole. This is in stark contrast with the prevailing contemporary account, which takes a continuum to be composed of an uncountably infinite set of points. This vlume presents a collective study of key ideas and debates within this history. The opening chapters focus on the ancient world, covering the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander. The treatment of the medieval period focuses on a (relatively) recently discovered manuscript, by Bradwardine, and its relation to medieval views before, during, and after Bradwardine's time. In the so-called early modern period, mathematicians developed the calculus and, with that, the rise of infinitesimal techniques, thus transforming the notion of continuity. The main figures treated here include Galileo, Cavalieri, Leibniz, and Kant. In the early party of the nineteenth century, Bolzano was one of the first important mathematicians and philosophers to insist that continua are composed of points, and he made a heroic attempt to come to grips with the underlying issues concerning the infinite. The two figures most responsible for the contemporary orthodoxy regarding continuity are Cantor and Dedekind. Each is treated in an article, investigating their precursors and influences in both mathematics and philosophy. A new chapter then provides a lucid analysis of the work of the mathematician Paul Du Bois-Reymond, to argue for a constructive account of continuity, in opposition to the dominant Dedekind-Cantor account. This leads to consideration of the contributions of Weyl, Brouwer, and Peirce, who once dubbed the notion of continuity "the master-key which . . . unlocks the arcana of philosophy". And we see that later in the twentieth century Whitehead presented a point-free, or gunky, account of continuity, showing how to recover points as a kind of "extensive abstraction". The final four chapters each focus on a more or less contemporary take on continuity that is outside the Dedekind-Cantor hegemony: a predicative approach, accounts that do not take continua to be composed of points, constructive approaches, and non-Archimedean accounts that make essential use of infinitesimals.

Varieties of Continua explores the development of the idea of the continuous. Hellman and Shapiro begin with two historical episodes. The first is the remarkably rapid transition in the course of the nineteenth century from the ancient Aristotelian view, that a true continuum cannot be composed of points, to the now standard, point-based frameworks for analysis and geometry found in modern mainstream mathematics (stemming from the work of Bolzano, Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind, Cantor, et al.). The second is the mid-tolate-twentieth century revival of pre-limit methods in analysis and geometry using infinitesimals including non-standard analysis (due to Abraham Robinson), and the more radical smooth infinitesimal analysis that uses intuitionistic logic. Hellman and Shapiro present a systematic comparison of these and related alternatives (including constructivist and predicative conceptions), weighing various trade-offs, helping articulate a modern pluralist perspective, and articulate a modern pluralist perspective on continuity. The main creative work of the book is the development of rigorous regions-based theories of classical continua, including Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, that are mathematically equivalent (inter-reducible) to the currently standard, point-based accounts in mainstream mathematics.

Stewart Shapiro's aim in Vagueness in Context is to develop both a philosophical and a formal, model-theoretic account of the meaning, function, and logic of vague terms in an idealized version of a natural language like English. It is a commonplace that the extensions of vague terms vary with such contextual factors as the comparison class and paradigm cases. A person can be tall with respect to male accountants and not tall (even short) with respect to professional basketball players. The main feature of Shapiro's account is that the extensions (and anti-extensions) of vague terms also vary in the course of a conversation, even after the external contextual features, such as the comparison class, are fixed. A central thesis is that in some cases, a competent speaker of the language can go either way in the borderline area of a vague predicate without sinning against the meaning of the words and the non-linguistic facts. Shapiro calls this open texture, borrowing the term from Friedrich Waismann.
The formal model theory has a similar structure to the supervaluationist approach, employing the notion of a sharpening of a base interpretation. In line with the philosophical account, however, the notion of super-truth does not play a central role in the development of validity. The ultimate goal of the technical aspects of the work is to delimit a plausible notion of logical consequence, and to explore what happens with the sorites paradox.
Later chapters deal with what passes for higher-order vagueness - vagueness in the notions of "determinacy" and "borderline" -- and with vague singular terms, or objects. In each case, the philosophical picture is developed by extending andmodifying the original account. This is followed with modifications to the model theory and the central meta-theorems.
As Shapiro sees it, vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon, due to the kinds of languages that humans speak. But vagueness is also due to the world we find ourselves in, as we try to communicate features of it to each other. Vagueness is also due to the kinds of beings we are. There is no need to blame the phenomenon on any one of those aspects.

Stewart Shapiro's aim in Vagueness in Context is to develop both a philosophical and a formal, model-theoretic account of the meaning, function, and logic of vague terms in an idealized version of a natural language like English. It is a commonplace that the extensions of vague terms vary with such contextual factors as the comparison class and paradigm cases. A person can be tall with respect to male accountants and not tall (even short) with respect to professional basketball players. The main feature of Shapiro's account is that the extensions (and anti-extensions) of vague terms also vary in the course of a conversation, even after the external contextual features, such as the comparison class, are fixed. A central thesis is that in some cases, a competent speaker of the language can go either way in the borderline area of a vague predicate without sinning against the meaning of the words and the non-linguistic facts. Shapiro calls this open texture, borrowing the term from Friedrich Waismann. The formal model theory has a similar structure to the supervaluationist approach, employing the notion of a sharpening of a base interpretation. In line with the philosophical account, however, the notion of super-truth does not play a central role in the development of validity. The ultimate goal of the technical aspects of the work is to delimit a plausible notion of logical consequence, and to explore what happens with the sorites paradox. Later chapters deal with what passes for higher-order vagueness - vagueness in the notions of 'determinacy' and 'borderline' - and with vague singular terms, or objects. In each case, the philosophical picture is developed by extending and modifying the original account. This is followed with modifications to the model theory and the central meta-theorems. As Shapiro sees it, vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon, due to the kinds of languages that humans speak. But vagueness is also due to the world we find ourselves in, as we try to communicate features of it to each other. Vagueness is also due to the kinds of beings we are. There is no need to blame the phenomenon on any one of those aspects.

Shapiro argues that both realist and anti-realist accounts of mathematics are problematic. To resolve this dilemma, he articulates a 'structuralist' approach, arguing that the subject matter of a mathematical theory is not a fixed domain of numbers that exist independent of each other, but rather is the natural structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle.

Stewart Shapiro presents a distinctive original view of the foundations of mathematics, arguing that second-order logic has a central role to play in laying these foundations. He gives an accessible account of second-order and higher-order logic, paying special attention to philosophical and historical issues. Foundations without Foundationalism is a key contribution both to philosophy of mathematics and to mathematical logic.

'In this excellent treatise Shapiro defends the use of second-order languages and logic as frameworks for mathematics. His coverage of the wide range of logical and philosophical . . . is thorough, clear, and persuasive.' Michael D. Resnik, History and Philosophy of Logic